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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report responds to the final paragraph of the statement by the President of the Security Council at its meeting on 7 July 1992, which declared that "the Security Council will continue to keep the situation in Angola under close review and looks forward to a further report by the Secretary-General at the beginning of the electoral campaign" (S/24249).

2. The official electoral campaign began on 29 August, one month before the simultaneous presidential and legislative elections, which are scheduled for 29 and 30 September 1992.

3. During the two and a half months since my most recent report on the activities of UNAVEM II (S/24145 of 24 June 1992), my Special Representative for Angola, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, has continued to consult closely with all parties in the peace and electoral process and has regularly contributed to meetings and consultations of the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC). She has met several times with President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and with Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA); with Ministers and representatives of the three observer countries (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America) as well as with diplomatic representatives of other Member States; with leaders of more than 20 other legally registered political parties, in addition to the Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) and UNITA; with church leaders; with non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and with representatives of the international and local media. She has maintained continuous contact with the President of the National Electoral Council and the Director General for Elections, and is now completing a round of visits to provincial capitals, where she has met with provincial electoral councils and officials of Government and all political parties, in addition to visiting troop assembly areas. Regular meetings have also been held with the representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations agencies in the country to ensure the coordination of all United Nations system activities related to the peace and electoral processes.

I. CURRENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS

4. The parties to the Bicesse Accords have achieved important results in maintaining peace since the Accords were signed 15 months ago and in preparing for the country's first-ever elections. Despite some noticeably rising tensions and incidents of political intimidation reported by UNAVEM over the last two months, there has been no major violation of the cease-fire, and the Angolan electoral authorities have registered 4.86 million voters. These achievements are remarkable and provide a basis for cautious optimism that the Angolan peace process can succeed, notwithstanding many difficulties and deficiencies.

5. Among the latter, the failure of both sides to complete certain very important tasks provided by the Peace Accords must figure large. As of 2 September 1992, only 41 per cent of the government and UNITA armies had been demobilized; only 19 per cent of the new unified Armed Forces had been formed; joint monitoring by the Government and UNITA of the national police had been fragmentary; and only a few dozen UNITA personnel had been incorporated into the police. Not only do the Bicesse Accords stipulate that the disbandment of the existing FAPLA and FALA armies, and the formation of the new, unified Armed Forces should be achieved by the time the elections are held, but these steps, and progress towards a neutral police force, are essential to the creation of conditions conducive to free and fair elections. All these issues have been intensively discussed by the Joint Political and Military Commission in recent weeks, with the active participation of UNAVEM II, and some measures have been taken to accelerate action. But time is running out and, unless drastic efforts are made, there is a dangerous prospect that several armies will continue to exist in Angola.

6. Meanwhile, the political and security situation throughout the country has deteriorated significantly. There are reports of intimidation and provocation by both Government and UNITA supporters. Violent incidents, accompanied by killings, have erupted since my last report, notably in Malange in early July and early August, as well as in Huambo, Saurimo and the provinces of Benguela and Bié. Several of them were deemed of sufficient gravity for the heads of the Joint Political and Military Commission and observer delegations, as well as of UNAVEM II, to travel there on an emergency basis to resolve the problems _in situ_. While it is noteworthy that both the Government and UNITA have so far restrained their supporters from letting such incidents get out of control, their increasing number and seriousness give rise to concern. It is encouraging that President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to all aspects of the peace process and a democratic future for Angola. Both parties are aware of the fact that the vast majority of the population are deeply against further war and that any party that instigates violence or which does not respect the election results, as verified by UNAVEM II, would provoke a very negative reaction both from the Angolan people and from the international community.

7. A problem that has surfaced only very recently, with the opening of the official political campaign, is the emergence in some provinces of doubts

about the effectiveness and impartiality of UNAVEM II. Accusations have recently been made, for example, in Moxico, Malange, Uige and Bengo provinces. President dos Santos himself made reference to these concerns at a public rally in Malange on 27 August 1992. They were subsequently raised with me by the Prime Minister of Angola at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Jakarta.

8. The role of an impartial observer is always difficult, the positions taken being open to different interpretations by the two sides, particularly after a long and bitter civil war. In this case, the complaints about UNAVEM have been of a very general nature. Where my Special Representative has been able to obtain specific examples, they mainly reflected misunderstanding of UNAVEM's role and an overestimation of the United Nations capacity and mandate. According to the Peace Accords and the mandate of the Security Council, UNAVEM II is in Angola not to organize or implement the cease-fire and electoral arrangements, but to observe and verify the monitoring of their implementation by the Angolan parties themselves. While interpreting this mandate in the widest and most active manner, UNAVEM has constantly stressed that it can work only through the consultative mechanisms set up under the Peace Accords at all levels and locations throughout Angola. But it is understandable that such distinctions are sometimes lost on a people who are so impatient for peace and who often look to UNAVEM for action that it is neither authorized nor equipped to take.

9. I have assured President dos Santos that all the matters he has raised will be thoroughly investigated and that I have the fullest confidence in my Special Representative. She and her staff will continue to carry out their difficult task with dedication, objectivity and impartiality. In this response and in a personal message to Mr. Savimbi, I have also stressed the need for leadership and tolerance at this critical juncture.

10. It was to be expected that the political temperature would rise as the elections drew closer. But the situation is not helped by the proliferation of weapons among the people, irrespective of their political affiliations, and by the volume of rumours and allegations about the intentions of both parties. Thus, the Government alleges that UNITA is maintaining and deploying hidden reserves of some of its best troops and that it has been systematically installing armed units in the main population centres. For its part, UNITA is deeply apprehensive about the so-called "anti-riot", or emergency, police which it alleges the Government has formed out of well-trained and well-equipped ex-FAPLA troops and which UNITA contends constitute a "parallel army". It is essential to dispel the current sense of insecurity and this requires decisive and urgent action by both leaders. Considerable hopes had been pinned on a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, originally planned for 24 August. The postponement of that meeting increased uncertainty and it is therefore a welcome development that it did eventually take place, on 7 September, reportedly in a most positive atmosphere, and that the two leaders have announced their intention to meet again before the elections.

11. An intractable and volatile problem is that of the province of Cabinda, whose offshore oil produces most of Angola's government revenue but which is amongst the most underdeveloped areas of Angola. Because of the activities of the Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda/Forças Armadas de Cabinda (FLEC/FAC), led by N'zita Tiago, and the FLEC Renovada, led by Jose Tiburcio, the province has to a large extent been left out of the peace and electoral processes. The Government has not confined its troops to the two assembly areas in Cabinda because the troops, according to the Government, are in that province for combat duty against the armed FLEC factions. Meanwhile, UNITA has kept only 100 soldiers at its own assembly area in the province. The Government and UNITA agree that negotiations could be held to address the issue of greater autonomy for the province. In early July 1992, the Government arranged high-level talks with moderate FLEC leaders, but the leaders of the two above-mentioned armed factions have not yet been ready to participate in negotiations. The registration of voters in Cabinda was marked by fear of intimidation by both FLEC and government forces and only about one fifth of Cabinda's eligible voters registered.

12. More than one year after the deadline stipulated by the Peace Accords for confinement of Government and UNITA troops and weapons in 46 assembly areas throughout Angola and despite massive international relief effort to such areas, the numbers of troops there remain dangerously low, particularly in the case of FAPLA, and have indeed declined by comparison with the latter part of last year. Troops on both sides have chafed at being kept so long in the assembly areas and poor living conditions and shortages of food and medicines have occasionally led to riots, particularly in the government assembly areas. UNAVEM, in cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP), has often had to render assistance.

13. Since 31 March 1992, emphasis has been placed on demobilization, the step which under the Peace Accords was to follow the assembly of troops. This has provided some incentive to troops to return to their assembly areas to receive their demobilization papers, cash and clothes. Even so the pace of demobilization has been slow and hampered by problems of organization, transport, logistics and resources. As of 2 September, a combined total of 61,994 (41 per cent) troops had been demobilized. The process has been faster on the Government's side (54,737, or 45 per cent) than on that of UNITA (7,257, or 24 per cent). The two parties declared that they would complete demobilization by the end of August 1992 but this proved to be unrealistic. The best that can be hoped is that, with strong political will and sustained efforts, demobilization can be completed before the elections.

14. New procedures introduced by the Joint Political and Military Commission and international assistance in transporting troops have helped to accelerate the process. Until the end of June 1992 all troops, including unassembled troops, were demobilized only through the assembly areas. Since 1 July all troops can now be demobilized in their specific locations without necessarily passing through the assembly areas. The current practice involves the selection and transport of troops to the new Angolan Armed Forces or to their home destinations; the transport of weapons and other military material to

storage areas; a verification visit to the relevant assembly area by the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission; followed by the formal closure of the assembly area by the Joint Political and Military Commission. Demobilization of troops in line with these procedures is being carried out in 26 assembly areas, 14 of the Government and 12 of UNITA. My Special Representative will continue to assist as much as possible in meeting the logistical and other requirements of demobilization within the limited resources available to UNAVEM. But the goal will be achieved only if both sides demonstrate the political will to complete this process.

15. As for collection of weapons, most are stored either at the assembly areas or at other locations chosen by the Government and UNITA. Many are also in private hands and this is a serious concern of the smaller political parties. Some progress has recently been made through a directive which designates locations where weapons belonging to FAPLA and FALA should be centralized and stored. Each storage area is guarded by a 50-man team made up of 25 from each party. Weapons storage is verified by the joint monitoring teams in conjunction with UNAVEM.

16. UNAVEM military observers remain in each assembly area until it is closed. Several assembly areas are near to closure but none has yet fulfilled all the conditions. As assembly areas close, United Nations military observers will be required to verify the arms stored in the designated areas until such time as these weapons are either selected for the new Armed Forces or destroyed.

17. Formation of the new 50,000 member Angolan Armed Forces is running woefully behind schedule, although high-ranking officers from both sides were sworn in on 26 August to head the command structure. The present declared intention is that all troops not selected to form the new Armed Forces will be demobilized and the new Armed Forces will then come into existence before the elections. Much depends on a solution being found to the acute problem of obtaining tents to accommodate the troops selected for the new Armed Forces.

18. The activities of the government/UNITA joint police monitoring mechanism have continued to be weak because of mutual mistrust, political interference by the two parties and inadequate logistical support for the monitoring teams, which continue to rely almost entirely on UNAVEM for their transport and communications.

19. Although the Peace Accords call for the Government to invite UNITA to participate in the national police, only 39 of the 183 UNITA personnel included in the first joint training course qualified for incorporation. The Government has promised to accept an additional 1,011 UNITA members. Another major problem has arisen over UNITA's contention that the Government has unilaterally and clandestinely transferred about 30,000 FAPLA troops into the "anti-riot", or emergency, police. The Government has refuted the numbers cited in this allegation, stating that the total strength of all its police, including the "anti-riot" police, is 39,830; that the total strength of the "anti-riot" police is currently only 1,030 and is planned to reach a strength

of 1,516 by the end of December 1992; that Armed Forces personnel were incorporated into the police even before the Peace Accords took effect; and that the Government has so far recruited only 4,080 of its demobilized troops into the police. This question is a major current concern of the Joint Political and Military Commission. It is evident that, in order for the police to be perceived as a neutral, national force, which will serve whatever Government comes into power as a result of free and fair elections, two ingredients are necessary: transparency and the increased incorporation of elements from outside the Government and MPLA. It should also be made clear that the "anti-riot" police will be kept in reserve to deal with emergencies and not deployed on a regular basis.

20. The extension of the Government's central administration throughout the whole country has now been almost completed, although not with equal effectiveness in all areas. All 163 municipalities are now covered, but 54 of the 542 communes remain without administration. It must be observed, however, that the delays in this process, caused as often as not by difficulties of logistics and infrastructure rather than by political factors, has adversely affected electoral registration in some remote areas.

21. As for the release of military and civilian prisoners, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has confirmed that the Government and UNITA completed the first phase in April 1992. Both sides say that they now hold no more prisoners, but both have outstanding claims against the other. ICRC also has lists of missing persons that have been presented to the Government and UNITA with a request for explanations. Action on this second phase is continuing, although experience of similar situations elsewhere suggests that the issue will continue to be under discussion for a long time.

22. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that 60,000 refugees have returned to Angola from Zaire and Zambia, without assistance. UNHCR has planned to help a further 270,000 refugees return from those two countries, but this operation began only on 11 August 1992 because of a lack of funds: UNHCR appealed to the international community in June for $55 million but has so far received only $2 million. Apart from the humanitarian consequences of this poor and late response, a large number of those refugees eligible to register and vote have been disenfranchized. A number of political parties have expressed concern to my Special Representative about this.

23. As for the elections, much has been achieved in the last two months. The dates of 29 and 30 September were confirmed by presidential decree on 16 July; 13 presidential candidates have been accepted by the Tribunal Popular Supremo; 2, however, have since stepped down. Eighteen parties out of the 25 now legalized are presenting candidates for the 220 seats in the future Legislative Assembly; the National Council for the Media has been set up; and electoral registration ended on 10 August.

24. However, the political parties have not reached agreement on one matter to which the President of the Security Council attributed special importance

in his statement of 7 July 1992: the adoption of a Code of Electoral Conduct. My Special Representative had emphasized in her meetings with the parties the importance of this being done before the official electoral campaign started. A draft prepared with the assistance of the United Nations was extensively debated among the political parties in the National Electoral Council. Some parties wanted the Government, and not only MPLA, to sign the Code, expressing concern about use of the Government's resources to help the MPLA campaign. The Government's view was that it was a code for political parties. Consequently, the election campaign has started without an agreed code.

25. The first of the three phases of the election - registration - ended on 10 August. Considering the enormous difficulties in this first-ever undertaking in a vast and war-ravaged country and the lack of adequate logistical resources (particularly as regards air and land transport and communications), the results surpassed expectations. This is due to the dedication and enthusiasm displayed at all levels, not least among the electoral brigades, many of whom were stranded for long periods in far-away places without proper food or accommodation and among rural voters, who in many cases, despite their impoverished circumstances, walked sometimes more than 50 kilometres, or for several days, in order to register. Great credit should also be given to the President of the National Electoral Council, Mr. Antonio Pinto Caetano de Sousa, and to the Director-General of Elections, Mr. Onofre dos Santos. The National Electoral Council has reported that 4.86 million eligible voters, i.e. 92 per cent of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million, were registered between the start of registration on 20 May and its conclusion on 10 August 1992, to which date the registration period had been extended from the original 31 July.

26. Nevertheless, concerns were raised that not every eligible voter might have had the opportunity to register, particularly in areas of difficult access such as the provinces of Moxico, Cuando Cubango and Uige. The reasons for this included a much-delayed start in some areas; lack of sufficient air support; late or inadequate delivery of materials; and, in some cases, delayed extension of the central administration. The situation would have been significantly worse had UNAVEM not made its helicopters available to transport electoral brigades and materials in many regions. Assistance provided on a cost-free basis by South Africa in the form of four helicopters, two fixed-wing aircraft and supporting personnel, also made an important contribution between early July and 6 August.

27. The Special Representative made several appeals for the registration period to be further extended beyond 10 August to cover the affected areas, as well as to register returning refugees. However, the National Electoral Council decided by majority vote against such an extension. While unregistered voters have demonstrated against this decision, there has been no official complaint, although UNITA has made clear that it would not accept any similar move to terminate voting on 30 September 1992 if there were still eligible people waiting to vote. It should also be noted that on 31 July 1992 the National Electoral Council, citing the lack of the necessary material

conditions, decided not to carry out registration of Angolans residing abroad as provided by the Electoral Law.

28. As required under the Electoral Law, the Special Representative has started verifying registration procedures. She has requested information on the location of registration teams, provincial estimates of the voting population and the criteria used for their calculation, the number and kinds of complaints received and information on how these complaints were dealt with.

29. Although the second phase - the electoral campaign - started officially on 29 August, leaders of MPLA and UNITA had already been campaigning actively throughout the country. The smaller parties have also been active to varying degrees. Their leaders have repeatedly expressed to the Special Representative their mounting concerns over the continued existence of the government and UNITA armies; the slow progress in demobilization and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces; and their difficulties in gaining access to all provinces, both because of their limited financial and transport resources and because of intimidation by Government and UNITA supporters. The political parties have also raised concerns over lack of access to the government-controlled national radio and television, have questioned their impartiality and have requested UNAVEM action. Since relatively few people have television sets or read newspapers, access to the radio is of particular importance. The Peace Accords call for the Government and UNITA to stop all hostile propaganda. Despite repeated attempts in the Joint Political and Military Commission over the past year to stop or reduce such broadcasts, the hostile propaganda put out by the Government radio's "Angola Combatente" programme and by UNITA's "Vorgan" radio station continued unabated. The Government, however, announced on 2 September that it had closed the "Angola Combatente" programme.

30. The 100 UNAVEM electoral observers already deployed in Angola's 18 provinces will monitor the electoral campaign closely. As during the registration period, their presence should enhance confidence and help to solve difficulties and complaints. These observers are already participating in civic education programmes, especially about the freedom and secrecy of the vote, as well as UNAVEM's role. They are emphasizing that UNAVEM's mandate is to observe the elections, in a totally impartial and objective manner, not to supervise or organize them, and that the first line of verification must be carried out by the Angolan political parties themselves. UNAVEM's activities during the campaign will be guided by the terms of reference approved by the Security Council, namely to verify whether political parties and forces, as well as individuals and groups, enjoy complete freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression, without hindrance or intimidation, and whether all political parties and forces have equal access to State media. I am confident that the UNAVEM II team, as it has always done in the past, will pursue these tasks with dedication.

31. The planning and execution of the third and crucial phase of the process - the actual voting - presents a formidable challenge to the national electoral authorities and to the UNDP team providing technical assistance.

While many of the organizational and logistical problems encountered during the registration were eventually overcome, this was done with great difficulty and in some cases delay, which cannot be countenanced in the very short two-day period in which voting has to take place. The experience gained with registration has highlighted both the needs and the possibilities. Above all, it has made crystal clear that adequate logistical planning and support are as important as political commitment on all sides to ensure free and fair elections. There must be no significant failure on the logistical front, which could be used either as an excuse for shortcomings or as a pretext to query the results.

32. Planning has been facilitated by the provision, through the United Nations, of specialized air logistical staff whose numbers it is hoped will soon be augmented sufficiently to permit coverage of all provincial capitals. While there are still many needs such as food, tents and other camping equipment for electoral officers, transport and communications are critical to success. As many vehicles as possible will have to be mobilized from all available local sources, both public and private. The requirements for air transport have been refined to 40 large helicopters and 9 fixed-wing aircraft. Fortunately, many offers and contributions, both in kind and in cash, have been received from the European Community, the Governments of France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United States and the private sector. As of 7 September, however, there was, on the basis of contributions firmly committed, a shortfall of four helicopters. These need to be provided in kind or rented, which would require a financial contribution of US$ 1 million. It has to be emphasized that the total of 40 represents a minimum requirement and makes no provision for malfunctioning or unforeseen developments. A few additional helicopters over and above that number would provide a much-needed safety back-up. The communications sector is also vital. Here, six INMARSAT terminals are required, each with an operator or technician, to be located at the five main operational support centres up country and in Luanda to provide essential guaranteed voice communications.

33. My Special Representative has helped to refine and coordinate these needs, and has advised the Angolan authorities on bringing them to the attention of potential donors. The urgent need for the international community to move speedily to cover the remaining requirements for helicopters and communications equipment cannot be overemphasized.

34. For its part, UNAVEM has also begun to put into place an operational plan for observing the voting at around 5,800 polling stations. As approved by the Security Council, 400 UNAVEM observers will be deployed in 200 two-person teams throughout Angola to carry out sample observations and monitor all stages of the poll, as well as to make a "quick count" of results as part of the verification. Each team will be able to visit a number of polling stations. The National Electoral Council has also invited international observers from intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and foreign Governments. While all categories of international observers will be guided by the Law on International Observation adopted by the People's Assembly in April 1992, those invited by the National Electoral Council will have a different status

from UNAVEM observers, who will be acting under the Security Council's mandate. However, in order to ensure an orderly overall observation effort, UNAVEM has offered assistance to the Angolan electoral authorities in bringing about maximum coordination and collaboration among all the teams.

35. UNAVEM's 400 observers will be composed of the 100 civilian observers already deployed; 100 to be selected from UNDP and other United Nations agency personnel in Angola, as well as volunteers from selected NGOs in the country; 100 from the United Nations Secretariat; and 100 contributed by Member States. The 200 observers coming from outside Angola are expected to arrive around 20 September and to attend, with their other colleagues, an intensive series of briefings both at UNAVEM headquarters in Luanda and in their respective provincial locations prior to the first day of the elections.

36. In determining the deployment of the 400 observers, UNAVEM will take into consideration the National Electoral Council's operational plan for polling stations; the location of UNAVEM civilian, military and police personnel already deployed throughout the country; and the communications, transport and other logistical support available. UNAVEM's operational plan also envisages a role for its military and police observers, in view of their wide knowledge of field conditions and the confidence they enjoy in their respective locations, to support the work of the electoral observers, especially in logistical aspects. UNAVEM's observers will operate largely as mobile teams and will thus in many cases depend heavily on air transport. UNAVEM's air unit will not therefore be available to fill gaps in the national electoral effort, as it did during registration, except on a very exceptional basis.

37. My Special Representative, in fulfilling her mandate to assess whether the Angolan elections have been conducted freely and fairly, will in particular examine very closely whether all registered voters were given, in practical terms, a fair opportunity to vote. This means that the National Electoral Council will have to ensure that voters in all areas who reach the voting stations at the latest by 7 p.m. on the second and last day of polling, 30 September, will be permitted to vote, even if this means extending the polling into the night. It will also be essential to ensure that, while police may be on call to help to resolve problems at voting stations, they will normally, as stipulated by the Electoral Law, not be nearer than 500 yards from the station unless an emergency dictates otherwise. The national electoral authorities plan to deploy some 24,000 "electoral police" to supervise proceedings and safeguard the ballot boxes.

38. The Electoral Law provides that the counting of ballots will take place at each polling station. The results will be centralized and announced officially at the provincial level within 6 days from the closing of the polls, although it is expected that the main trends will be known by the major political parties and UNAVEM within 24 hours. Subsequently, the National Electoral Council will centralize the results obtained in each of the 18 provinces and announce the national results within a maximum period of 8 days after closing of the polls. In order to secure election as President, a candidate must gain an absolute majority of the valid votes cast, otherwise a

second round will be necessary, which according to the timetable established by the Electoral Law, might not take place until early November.

39. UNAVEM's contingency planning for a second round again provides for the presence of the 200 additional observers contributed by Member States and the Secretariat. Bearing in mind the logistical complications involved in transporting such a large number of people out of Angola after the first round and back into the country shortly thereafter, I have decided that it would be more practical for the 200 observers to remain in Angola if the results of the first round made a second round necessary.

40. While the elections are the culminating point of the peace process, it is evident that they are not an end in themselves but the springboard for a new era. Concerns have been expressed, both by Angolans and by foreign observers, as to what will happen during the delicate period of transition as the new Government assumes power. Both President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi have referred publicly to the possibility of UNAVEM's being asked to remain for a limited period and there are indications that this issue will be discussed at a further meeting between them, as well as in consultations between President dos Santos and other parties. When this possibility has been mentioned to my Special Representative, she has stressed that any such extension would require first and foremost an official request by the Angolan Government, based on consensus, and thereafter on a decision by the Security Council; and that the mandate would need to be clearly defined and limited both in time and scope.

II. UNAVEM II LOGISTICS, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

41. Sufficient vehicles, communications equipment, accommodation and general stores are now in place to meet UNAVEM II's operational and electoral observation needs until the scheduled conclusion of its mandate on 31 October 1992. With the arrival of seven United Nations security guards in July 1992, the security of UNAVEM II has improved. In addition, the guards supplied by a contracted security firm have been sent to Huambo to secure the helicopters positioned at the airport. The approved staffing of the Administrative Office is 97; however to date only 82 have arrived and this has created some difficulties in ensuring that the proper financial and administrative controls are in place.

42. The budgetary and staffing situation would clearly have to be reviewed should the eventualities outlined in paragraphs 39 and 40 above materialize.

III. OBSERVATIONS

43. Angola is to be congratulated for maintaining its cease-fire for 15 months, and for its success in registering the great majority of its adult population for the presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September.

44. If the leaders of the Government and UNITA maintain, without reservation, their determination to make the peace process succeed and to prevent their country from returning to violence, anarchy and hopeless poverty and if they foster restraint among their followers during the remaining critical weeks of political campaigning, they will lay the groundwork for a prosperous, democratic future and will prove to the world that Angola is worthy of investment and that this region of Africa can overcome its enormous problems. To do otherwise would mean to ruin prospects for the peace and prosperity so deserved by the Angolan people. The Angolan example can also benefit efforts to build peace and democracy in other parts of the world where the United Nations is actively involved.

45. For this to happen, the Angolans must protect their achievements on the cease-fire and registration of voters by making an all-out and determined effort before the elections to demobilize the remaining government and UNITA troops, collect and centralize storage of weapons, form the new Angolan Armed Forces, disband FAPLA and FALA before the voting and ensure that the police operate correctly.

46. Both main political parties are increasing pressure on each other during the campaign and more incidents will occur. The fact that the same two parties that signed the Bicesse Peace Accords are also the main contenders for elected office places great responsibility on their shoulders. Attempts by them to gain electoral advantage at any expense can all too easily endanger the peace process. To prevent this happening will demand real statesmanship and long-term vision. The Angolan political and military leaders will now have to exercise maximum restraint themselves and impose strict discipline on their followers.

47. It is also essential that all political parties now pledge themselves to respect the results of the elections, as verified by UNAVEM II. I appeal particularly to the Government and UNITA to ensure that their representatives and the various media under their control do not present inaccurate, distorted or inflammatory reports during the next few crucial weeks. Such reporting compromises the free and fair climate that is needed for voters to make up their minds properly and vote without fear or deception.

48. Just as the international community would, I am confident, react very negatively to any party that caused the peace process to fail, so must it stand ready to assist Angola in bringing about lasting peace and democracy. Much has been invested in the peace process. The United Nations, the three observers (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States) and donor countries have already played a key part in assisting implementation of the Peace Accords. Military, police and civilian observers of UNAVEM II have inspired confidence in the process among the population by verifying its implementation at dozens of locations throughout the country. Vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, food and tents are being delivered to help with demobilization and registration of voters. There is still a need in the coming days for donor countries to help further in the enormous task of deploying about 5,800 Angolan teams around the country to man the voting booths. Helicopters and

communications equipment are the key items. The remaining requirements for them should be loaned and delivered immediately or funds be provided for their rental.

49. The world will be watching Angola before, and after, the elections. I appeal to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and to Mr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi to make sure that, whatever happens in the next critical weeks, they continue to honour their commitments under the Peace Accords. Whatever the role of the United Nations, the duty to overcome difficulties lies primarily with the Angolans themselves and with their leaders. It is imperative that they cooperate closely with each other and with the United Nations in order to ensure the success of the elections. It is also essential that they guarantee, and take all necessary steps to protect, the safety of United Nations personnel and property.

50. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to express my support for, and pay tribute to, my Special Representative, to the Chief Military Observer, Major General Edward U. Unimna, and to the military, police and civilian personnel of UNAVEM II who are tackling with courage, impartiality and determination the challenging task of helping the Angolans to achieve just and lasting peace in their country.